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Goldman [Sachs] should matter to outsiders . . . because it stands at
the centre of a two-decade-long transformation of the financial
markets and a new approach to risk. Business risks that were once
seen as a lumpy fact of life are now routinely sliced up and packaged
into combinations that generally suit issuers and investors alike. At
the heart of this change has been the development of huge markets in
swaps, derivatives and other complex and often opaque instruments
that allow the transfer of risk from one party to another. From small
beginnings in 1987, the face value of contracts in interest-rate and
currency derivatives is now more than $200 trillion[,] 16 times
America’s GDP. A further $17 trillion is outstanding in (even
newer) credit-default swaps, which allow bond investors to lay off
1
the risk of issuers defaulting.

I. INTRODUCTION
Heralded as the “debutante of the suretyship world (pure as the
wind-driven snow and virtually unsullied by the foul touch of
litigation),” credit default swaps (CDS) have transformed banking. 2
Lenders who once found themselves stuck with bundles of indivisible,
illiquid risks can now carve out and hedge credit exposure to individual
borrowers. And they do it on a massive scale. As last reported by
FitchRatings, the notional amount of outstanding CDS stood at $3.5
trillion, representing two-thirds of the entire credit derivatives market
and an 86% increase from the prior year’s total of $2.8 trillion. 3 Yet
despite such rapid growth, use of credit derivatives was too small to be
either noticed or recorded at any significant levels in 1996.4
1.
On Top of the World: In Its Taste for Risk, the World’s Leading Investment
Bank Epitomises the Modern Financial System, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2006, at 11.
2.
Robert D. Aicher et al., Credit Enhancement: Letters of Credit, Guaranties,
Insurance and Swaps (The Clash of Cultures), 59 BUS. LAW. 897, 898 (2004). For lack
of a more elegant formulation, “CDS” will be used (1) as a noun to refer to “credit
default swap” (singular) and “credit default swaps” (plural), and (2) as an adjective to
refer to the markets, contracts and other entities that are related to credit default swaps.
3.
FitchRatings, Global Credit Derivatives Survey: Single-Name CDS Fuel
Growth (2004), available at http://www.fitchratings.com (requires login) (hereinafter
FITCHRATINGS REPORT 2004); FitchRatings, Global Credit Derivatives Survey: Risk
Dispersion Accelerates (2005), available at http://www.fitchratings.com (requires
login) (hereinafter FITCHRATINGS REPORT 2005).
4. Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Bank Derivatives Report: Third Quarter
2005 (2005), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/deriv/deriv.htm (hereinafter OCC
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As one would expect of a market that has gone from cradle to world
phenomenon in less than a decade, CDS have attracted both supporters
and detractors. Proponents extol the ability of CDS to spread risk and
increase liquidity across credit markets, allowing participants to actively
manage and protect credit portfolios. 5 Sensational critics warn that a
spike in interest rates could trigger a “derivatives tsunami” that would
bring all of the major banks to their knees and cause a “blowup” in
world credit markets. 6 Experience in the past few years has shown that,
if used responsibly, CDS have the ability to yield all of the promised
benefits with few—if any—of the predicted catastrophes. 7 Between the
REPORT 3Q 2005).
5.
See, e.g., FitchRatings, Global Credit Derivatives Survey: A Qualified
Success (2003), available at http://www.fitchratings.com (requires login) (hereinafter
FITCH RATINGS REPORT 2003); JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER
DERIVATIVES 507 (6th ed. 2005).
6.
Mara Der Hovanesian et al., Taking Risk to the Extreme: Will Derivatives
Cause a Major Blowup in the World’s Credit Markets?, BUSINESS WEEK, May 23,
2005, at 96. It is worth noting that many of the apocalyptic articles about CDS came
following the downgrading of GM debt in April 2005. Responding to the doom-andgloom contingent, Global Finance reported in September 2005 that the CDS market
was far more efficient at absorbing large financial shocks than anyone could have
expected:
There had been concerns that growth in credit derivatives volume, much of which
comes from credit default swaps, could be stalled by concerns about involvement in
the market following the downgrade of Ford and General Motors in April and the
resultant problems in the credit market. However, the credit derivatives market
appears to have been strengthened by the experience, and new entrants—largely
pension funds and other institutional investors—have kept their nerve as the market
has recovered.

Laurence Neville, Credit Derivatives Market Primed to Explode, GLOBAL FINANCE
MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2006, at 8.
7.
See, e.g., Fitch Ratings Report 2003, supra note 5, at 4-5; Fitch Ratings
Report 2005, supra note 3; Neville, Credit Derivatives Market Primed to Explode,
supra note 5, at 8. Early in 2006, the Financial Times reported the incident of a twentysix-year-old CDS trader at Deutsche Bank in London, who had misstated his position
by £30 million ($53 million). Paul J. Davies, Deutsche Trader Was “High-Flyer,” FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006. While noting that gross trader slipups and cover-ups naturally
raise the specter of the Barings collapse, the Financial Times rightly concluded that
such incidents simply show that managers must “get to grips with the complexities of
the new markets. The age-old adage about investing only in what you understand still
works. There is no substitute for . . . understanding the products on which [derivatives]
are based, [their] potential volatility and how the instruments should be valued.” Back
to Basics for Derivatives Traders: There Is No Substitute for Fundamental Analysis in
Credit Markets, FIN. TIMES Jan. 12, 2006, at 18.
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disparagers and the defenders of CDS stand the regulators. But who are
the regulators of CDS markets, and what law applies?
Since CDS are traded entirely over-the-counter (OTC), one could
argue that the true regulators are market participants themselves.
Banded together as members of the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA), derivatives markets participants have created a
system of documenting and amending trade relationships that is both
flexible and robust. Most members of ISDA are banks or groups of
banks. Some outside regulators, however, worry that CDS markets are
growing too quickly for any bank or group of banks to control. 8
In judging who has authority to step in and govern various aspects
of CDS trading, one confronts a crowd of would-be regulators. The
CFTC, SEC, Fed, state insurance regulators, and both state and federal
courts all have spheres of competence that, depending on circumstances,
may or may not affect CDS trading. Letters of guarantee and other
analogous surety instruments require their users to focus on merely one
body of statutory law—e.g., Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial
Code—and its applicable case precedents; CDS, on the other hand,
demand that their users at least take account of (and perhaps apply)
commodities, securities, banking, and insurance regulation, as well as all
applicable case law.
Where commodities regulation is concerned, CDS enjoy a blanket
exemption under the Commodities Exchange Act. 9 The Commodities
Exchange Act (the “Act”) includes in its definition of “excluded
commodity” any “credit risk or measure.” 10 Building on this definition
in a section on “excluded derivative transactions,” the Act notes that its
terms do not apply to any agreement in an excluded commodity where
such agreements are executed between eligible participants—financial
institutions, regulated insurance companies, and most investment
companies—off of a registered exchange. 11 Similar provisions apply to
“excluded swap transactions.” 12
The combined effect of these
provisions provides complete exemption from CFTC supervision for the

8.
See, e.g., Hamish Risk, Credit Derivatives Market Expands to $17.3 Trillion
(2006) available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=a9mg
9712QnRU&refer=us.
9.
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (2000).
10.
Id. at § 1a(13).
11.
Id. at § 2(d).
12.
Id. at § 2(g).
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users of CDS. 13
Although the regulatory landscape is somewhat more complicated
in the securities context, the result is the same: general exemption. Both
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 exclude from the purview of
regulated securities all security-based and non-security-based swap
agreements, as defined in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 14 Under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, if a CDS relates only to loan and other debt
obligations—which is often the case—then it qualifies as a “nonsecurity-based swap agreement.” 15 Further, as long as CDS are drafted
to avoid (1) being characterized as contingent options on debt securities
and (2) physical delivery of securities, then they will fall under the
exemption for security-based swap agreements. 16 Thus, the securities
regulations collectively work to exempt CDS from SEC registration and
reporting requirements. 17
In banking regulation, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency has declared generally: “National banks may enter into credit
derivative transactions. A national bank may use debt securities that are
not investment grade debt securities or the credit equivalents thereof, to
hedge bank permissible derivative, including credit derivative,
transactions.” 18 On a day-to-day level, the Federal Reserve monitors
banks’ CDS trading activities to ensure that traders are properly
documenting transactions and that other applicable best practices are
being observed. 19 Although crucial as referees in daily trading, Federal
13.
Although CDS are OTC products, the Financial Times has reported Eurex and
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange are currently competing to be the first exchange to
introduce a credit derivatives futures product. Doug Cameron, Eurex Targets Credit
Derivatives Market, FIN TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006. Such products, which would be linked
to credit derivatives indexes, could possibly trigger a reevaluation, or at least a greater
clarification, of the place of credit derivatives as they relate to the Commodities
Exchange Act. Whatever the outcome of such reevaluation, the exempt status of OTC
CDS as financial instruments would surely go unmodified.
14.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2A(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1 (2000); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §3A(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1 (2000).
15.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206C, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2000).
16.
Id. §§ 206A(a)(3), (b)(1)-(4), 206B.
17.
Despite this general exemption, the prohibitions on fraud, insider trading and
manipulation under the Securities and Securities Exchange acts still apply. See
Securities Act of 1933, supra note 14, §17(a); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra
note 14, §§9(a), 10(b), 15(c)(1), 16(a), 16(b), 20(d).
18.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ACTIVITIES PERMISSIBLE
FOR A NATIONAL BANK 38 (2005).
19.
See, e.g., Risk, supra note 8. Commenting on the Fed’s efforts to monitor
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Banking Regulators and their work do not stand to fundamentally
regulate the substance of CDS trading going into the future.
As for judicial regulation, the claim that CDS are “virtually
unsullied by the foul touch of litigation” bears out in practice. In its
2005 CDS survey, FitchRatings reported that in 2004 only 8% of credit
events involved any form of dispute, down from 14% in 2003. 20 Of the
credit events that involved disputes, “the vast majority . . . have been
settled or are being resolved without litigation.” 21 And for good reason.
ISDA and its members have a vested interest in shaping the definitions
used under the ISDA Master Agreement. The biggest cases involving
CDS have involved questions as to how to interpret terms related to
sovereign restructuring under the Master Agreement. 22 Mitu Gulati and
Stephen Choi relate that in the most prominent of these recent cases,
ISDA moved to revise its definitions, create sovereign debt analysis
subcommittees, and respond to lawyer recommendations before the ink
had even dried on the opinion. 23 Although their full effect is yet to be
seen, ISDA’s most recent 2003 Credit Definitions will likely serve to
further reduce the incidence of CDS disputes—keeping the market “pure
as the wind-driven snow.”
While CDS regulation has crystallized in SEC, CFTC, Fed, court
and ISDA-dictated law since trading took off in the late 1990s, the state
of insurance regulation remains unsettled in many places. At bottom,
the issue for state insurance regulators is whether credit default swaps,
as instruments that distribute risk for a fee, should qualify as capital
markets products that escape regulation under state law. To many
market observers, the answer is a resounding yes.
New York updated its insurance laws to exclude CDS in 2004
(making explicit mention of ISDA’s Credit Derivatives Definitions), but
many states have followed suit. 24 Introducing more confusion, the
CDS trading, Bloomberg reports: “The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has
demanded action to tackle a backlog of contracts left unsigned for months on concern
the undocumented transactions threaten the stability of the financial system.” Id.
20.
FITCHRATINGS REPORT 2005, supra note 3, at 9-10.
21.
Id. at 10.
22.
See, e.g., Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 375
F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2004); Aon Fin. Prod. v. Societe Generale, No. 00 Civ. 5863GBD,
2005 WL 427535 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
23.
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1129, 1144 (2006).
24.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901(j-1) (2005); 2004 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 605 (S. 6679-A)
(approved and effective Oct. 19, 2004). Colorado’s insurance statute, to cite one
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National Association of Insurance Commissioners has issued guidelines,
and defined insurance in such a way that CDS clearly qualify as
insurance contracts. Responding to the uncertainty, practitioners and
ISDA have pointed to the “insurable interest” and “indemnification”
requirements of most state insurance regimes to say that CDS are capital
markets products that should not be subject to regulation under state law.
While these two concepts wield notable power in the argument over
whether CDS are insurance, they do not wholly explain why and how
the two regimes differ from one another. Absent a comprehensive
theory to demonstrate how and why credit default swaps are capital
market products that transcend state insurance regulation, state
regulators will legislate in light of guidance that suggests otherwise.
The aim of this article is to develop an explanatory theory of why
CDS are not insurance. Section II gives a brief overview of the function
and use of CDS and ISDA in today’s derivatives markets. Building
from this account, Section III will first review the development of
insurance laws as they pertain to CDS in the State of New York, then
explain and evaluate the approach of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners to derivatives whose function centers around
fee-based risk distribution.
Finally, Section III develops a
comprehensive comparison of CDS and insurance at both the contractual
level and a wider market level. Having stated a theory of how CDS
differ from insurance, this paper will set forth conclusions.
II. THE FUNCTION AND USE OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
A. Using Credit Default Swaps to Hedge Credit Risk
As banks enter into lending and other debt arrangements, they
receive bundles of different risks. Among the possible risks that can
arise in lending arrangements are: interest-rate/market risk (possibility
that market interest rates will unexpectedly shift during the term of the
agreement), liquidity risk (inability to buy or sell an instrument without
example, states: “‘Insurance’ means a contract whereby one, for consideration,
undertakes to indemnify another or to pay a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit
upon determinable risk contingencies, and includes annuities.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-1102(7) (2004). CDS could easily fit this vague statutory outline. For more examples of
state insurance statutes, see NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, DEFINITION OF INSURANCE
WORKING GROUP WHITE PAPER 2-4 (2000) (hereinafter NAIC DEFINITION OF
INSURANCE WHITE PAPER).
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adversely affecting price), and credit risk (risk that the note issuer will
default). 25 Although banks receive market-driven compensation for
assuming such risks, they might—depending on the diversity of their
portfolios—desire to keep liquidity and interest rate risks, but trade
credit risk. They also might wish to diminish their Basle-dictated capital
reserve requirements by unloading some of the risks on their balance
sheets. CDS facilitate this type of risk trading. 26
The following example illustrates how a CDS agreement might be
structured. 27 Borrower writes a $50 million note to Bank. Desiring to
reduce its exposure to Borrower, Bank finds a credit protection seller
and enters into a three-year CDS as the credit protection buyer with the
notional amount of the contract set equal to the note’s face value. The
bank/protection buyer commits to annually pay a small percentage of the
notional amount (spread) to the protection seller either until the maturity
of the CDS or until a specified event of default (credit event) occurs.
The protection seller’s obligation can be defined in one of two ways.
Upon occurrence of a credit event, a CDS contract can obligate the
protection seller to either (1) physically settle the CDS by taking
delivery of the defaulted note in exchange for its face value, or (2) cash
settle the note. Where a CDS is cash settled, the parties can designate an
independent agent to poll other market participants to decide what the
recovery value of the note would be, and the protection seller must then
pay the protection buyer the difference between the notional amount and
the recovery value. 28
This simple arrangement raises two important issues, the first
relating to a definition of a credit event and a second concerning the
protection buyer’s loss. First, the parties define the credit event in
relation to a “reference entity,” which may or may not be the party that
25.
See, e.g., ANTULIO N. BOMFIM, UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND
RELATED INSTRUMENTS 3-5 (2005).
26.
For more on the Basle accords and their relation to capital adequacy
requirements under U.S. law, see Heath Price Tarbert, Are International Capital
Adequacy Rules Adequate? The Basle Accord and Beyond, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1771
(2000); Barbara C. Matthews, Capital Adequacy, Netting, and Derivatives, 2 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 167 (1995); Heath Price Tarbert, Rethinking Capital Adequacy: The Basle
Accord and the New Framework, 56 BUS. LAW. 767 (2001).
27.
See, e.g., BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 68-69; HULL, supra note 5, at 507-09.
28.
See, e.g., BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 69; HULL, supra note 5, at 508. Antulio
Bomfim notes that, “Cash settlement is more common in Europe than in the United
States, where, by far, the majority of CDS are physically settled.” BOMFIM, supra note
25, at 69.

176

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XII

exposes the protection buyer to credit risk. If the protection buyer is
exposed to the credit risk of a corporation, then the credit event can
often be defined in terms of the corporation’s bankruptcy, failure to pay,
restructuring of debt, acceleration, or downgrading by a credit-rating
agency (see fig. 1). Complications can arise, however, when the credit
risk to be hedged flows from sovereign debt, cash or synthetic CDOs, 29
or an SPV. For example, sovereigns and trusts do not declare
bankruptcy like corporations do; they are likely to have different or
more complicated debt structures, and changes in their credit standing
may not be as easy to discern. As a result, the parties to a CDS can
designate a wholly different reference entity—portfolio of sovereign
bonds, a bond futures index, etc.—that better suits their purposes (see
fig. 2). Figures 1 and 2 show stylized examples of both types of CDS
transactions.
The second related issue to note in this context is that the protection
buyer need not evidence actual loss to claim under a credit default swap.
The sole trigger for the protection seller’s performance is the credit
event. Another way of expressing the same observation is to point out
that the protection-buyer does not even need to own the reference
obligation to claim under a CDS. 30
The CDS market has become so thick for top reference entities—
which include both corporations such as Ford and Fannie Mae and
sovereigns such as Brazil and France—that market makers have arisen
who continually quote both bid spreads (as protection buyers) and ask
spreads (as protection-sellers). Indices in both North America (Dow
Jones CDX) and Europe (iTraxx) track credit default spreads for the top
125 investment-grade companies on each continent. 31 The price
discovery provided by such indices facilitates the quick and easy sale of
CDS portfolios, making the CDS market much more liquid than it would
otherwise be.

29.
For an explanation of CDOs and their relation to CDS, see BOMFIM, supra
note 25, at 133-43; HULL, supra note 5, at 516-18.
30.
See, e.g., David Z. Nirenberg & Richard J. Hoffman, Are Credit Default
Swaps Insurance? 3 DERIVATIVES REP. 7 (Dec. 2001).
31.
See HULL, supra note 5, at 510; FITCHRATINGS REPORT 2005, supra note 3, at
9.
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STRAIGHTFORWARD CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP

FIGURE 2
VARIATION CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP
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B. Function of ISDA and the ISDA Master Agreement
The organizations that deal in privately negotiated, OTC derivatives
belong to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).
ISDA currently numbers over 670 member institutions in over fifty
countries. 32 Chartered in 1985, ISDA emerged as an organization whose
mission was to create and promote standardized documentation for
derivatives at a time when even simple derivatives transactions had high
transaction costs. 33 The first widely used ISDA documentation was the
1987 Master Agreement, with subsequent versions released in 1992 and
2002. 34 The Master Agreements set forth standardized, market-driven
terms regulating general obligations of the parties, events of default,
netting, early termination, transfer, currency provisions, and
definitions. 35 If parties desire to modify any default provisions in the
Master Agreement for their transaction, they may do so in an amending
document called a “Schedule.” 36 The Master Agreement and Schedule,
in turn, are given effect in “confirmations,” which are documents that
serve as evidence of individual transactions under a Master
Agreement. 37 A typical confirmation in a CDS trade sets forth all
32.
See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Prevost, Chair, ISDA North America Tax
Committee, and Robert Pickel, Executive Director, ISDA, to the Internal Rev. Serv. 2
(Mar. 7, 2006), available at http://www.isda.org/; cf. Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a
Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 228 (2001). Flanagan relates:
[ISDA’s] Primary Membership is composed of dealers and encompasses banks,
securities companies, and large corporations from over thirty countries, including
institutions such as Barclays; Chase Manhattan Bank; Credit Suisse First Boston
International; Deutsche Bank AG; Enron Corporation; Sumitomo Bank Capital
Markets, Inc.; and Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. The Associate Membership includes
diverse professional firms and corporations such as Allen & Overy; the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange; Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Euroclear; KPMG Peat Marwick,
L.L.P.; Standard & Poor’s; and QT Software AG. Id.
33.
See About ISDA, http://www.isda.org/wwa/wwa_nav.html (last visited Mar.

23, 2006); cf. Flanagan, supra note 32, at 227–38.
34.
See ISDA Opinions and Documentation, http://www.isda.org/docproj/
ncdproj.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
35.
See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT (2002)
[hereinafter ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT]; INT’L SWAP DEALERS ASS’N, ISDA MASTER
AGREEMENT (1992).
36.
See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA SCHEDULE TO THE 2002
MASTER AGREEMENT (2002); INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA SCHEDULE TO
THE MASTER AGREEMENT (1992).
37.
INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2003 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES
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material terms, including reference entity, payment structure, credit
events, settlement terms, and term of the agreement. 38
One of the key benefits of using the ISDA Master Agreement is that,
once in place between two parties, all transactions entered into under
39
the Master Agreement constitute a single agreement. An end-user
corporation and a swap dealer may exchange large numbers of
confirmations over the course of several years, resulting in hundreds
of simultaneous swaps between the parties. Without a master
agreement, these swaps would require that the two parties exchange
hundreds of payments at each swap payment date. The terms of the
ISDA Master Agreement, however, can provide for netting the
payments among all transactions made under the agreement between
the parties (called “cross-transaction payment netting”). This
reduces transaction costs since numerous swap payments are
40
incorporated into a single payment.

Adding to the payment netting regime, the ISDA Master Agreement
also provides for “close-out netting” that applies when one party to a
transaction defaults or declares bankruptcy. 41 Close-out netting allows
the non-defaulting party to “calculate a single settlement amount by
offsetting its scheduled future payment and delivery obligations to the
bankrupt party against the bankrupt party’s obligations to it.” 42 The
practical benefit of a close-out netting arrangement is that it precludes a
trustee or liquidator in bankruptcy from “cherry picking”—i.e.,
repudiating all trades that are out of the money for the bankrupt estate
while insisting on performance of all trades that accrue to the estate’s
benefit. 43
DEFINITIONS 1, Exhibit A, at 61 (2003) [hereinafter ISDA CREDIT DEFINITIONS]; see
also Flanagan, supra note 32, at 230.
38.
ISDA CREDIT DEFINITIONS, supra note 37, Exhibit A, at 61-70. Like similar
confirmations in other derivatives transactions, CDS confirmations provide that: “This
Confirmation supplements, forms part of, and is subject to, the ISDA Master Agreement
. . . between you and us. All provisions contained in the Agreement govern this
Confirmation except as expressly modified below.” Id. at 61.
39.
ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 35, § 1(c), at 1 (“All Transactions are
entered into in reliance on the fact that this Master Agreement and all Confirmations
form a single agreement between the parties . . . and the parties would not otherwise
enter into any Transactions.”).
40.
Flanagan, supra note 32, at 230-31.
41.
See ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 35, at 11-15.
42.
Flanagan, supra note 32, at 231.
43.
S. Rory Derham, Set-off and Netting of Foreign Exchange Contracts in the
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To the extent that CDS trades are documented under ISDA Master
Agreements, the single-agreement, cross-payment netting, and close-out
netting structures apply across CDS markets. The usefulness of such
arrangements becomes clear when one considers the fallout of Barings,
Drexel-Burnham, or Enron-like bankruptcies, where the bankrupt party
potentially has long and short positions in dozens of CDS transactions
with multiple counterparties. Without a master agreement, each trade
would have to be individually reckoned with the risk, which a trustee
would be able to repudiate trades that did not accrue to the bankrupt’s
benefit. With a master agreement in place, all CDS trades executed with
each party under a Master Agreement can be assessed as a net amount
under the established close-out netting mechanism.
ISDA performs another vital function for CDS—and other
derivatives—markets through its publication of protocols. 44 ISDA
protocols are ISDA-written contract amendments that allow all Master
Agreement adherents to respond in a unified way to market
disturbances. For CDS markets, ISDA’s CDS Index Protocols are
particularly important. In normal circumstances, when a protection
buyer and protection seller trade CDS on a company that is listed on a
credit derivatives index, the index provides a price-discovery function
that allows the parties to determine what spread is appropriate and how
to settle their trade. However, the bankruptcy filing of an index-listed
company throws trading into chaos. In response, an ISDA CDS Index
Protocol “gives market participants a way to settle trades based on such
indexes, by amending the documentation for such trades from physical
to cash settlement and participating in an auction to determine the final
price for . . . bonds” of the bankrupt company. 45 All affected parties
who send ISDA an adherence letter can take advantage of the unified
response, giving all adhering parties equal footing in dealing with the
bankrupt reference entity.

Liquidation of a Counterparty: Part 2, Netting, 1991 J. BUS. L. 536, 537 (1991).
44.
See http://www.isda.org/protocol/prot_nav.html (last visited May 9, 2006).
45.
Christopher Faille, ISDA Publishes Protocol for Dana, HEDGEWORLD DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 16, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 4426607; see also INT’L SWAPS AND
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2006 DANA CDS INDEX PROTOCOL (2006).
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III. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND INSURANCE REGULATION
A. Credit Default Swaps and New York Insurance Regulation
From their inception, CDS have provoked observers to ask whether
they should be classified as insurance. Their general form and function
reflect many basic insurance arrangements. 46
The New Oxford
American Dictionary defines insurance as “a practice or arrangement by
which a company . . . provides a guarantee of compensation for
specified loss . . . in return for payment of a premium” and, even more
simply, as “a thing providing protection against a possible
eventuality.” 47 Under both of these matching definitions, CDS look and
feel like textbook insurance contracts. Since insurance is an area of state
regulation, one must look to state statutes to determine whether or not
CDS receive insurance classification.
Until a short time ago it was unclear that CDS were not insurance
contracts under New York law, which provides that:
‘Insurance contract’ means any agreement or other transaction
whereby one party, the ‘insurer,’ is obligated to confer benefit of
pecuniary value upon another party, the ‘insured’ or ‘beneficiary,’
dependent upon the happening of a fortuitous event in which the
insured or beneficiary has, or is expected to have at the time of such
happening, a material interest which will be adversely affected by
48
the happening of such event.

Providing further guidance, New York law defines “fortuitous
event” as “any occurrence or failure to occur which is, or is assumed by
the parties to be, to a substantial extent beyond the control of either
party.” 49 Viewed on their face, these statutes define insurance contracts
such that CDS—at least those with exogenous credit events—could be
subject to insurance regulation, possibly making protection sellers
civilly and even criminally liable for “doing an insurance business”
without the proper license. 50
46.
See, e.g., BOMFIM, supra note 25, at 68 (observing that “a credit default swap
shares many similarities with traditional insurance products”).
47.
NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (2d ed., 2005).
48.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a)(1) (2000); cf. id. § 107(a)(27).
49.
Id. § 1101(a)(2).
50.
See, e.g., id. § 1101(b); Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 8–10.
Commenting on legal liability for selling insurance without a license, Nirenberg and
Hoffman explain:
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Concerned legal practitioners reacted to such provisions by
stressing that the objectives of, and parties involved in, CDS transactions
should preclude them from being regulated as insurance. 51 New York
practitioners David Nirenberg and Richard Hoffman applied this line of
reasoning in a 2001 Derivatives Report article, and argued that the state
regulates insurance to preserve its “natural interest in the safety and
health of its inhabitants.” 52 This organic instinct does not apply to CDS
markets and their refined practitioners. The state and its citizens do not
care when a credit event occurs in relation to a basket of securities or a
reference obligor. 53 Confirming this point, the authors relate that “88%
of the protection buyers and 86% of protection sellers . . . [a]re banks,
securities firms, and insurance companies—hardly a group requiring
protection. In fact, virtually 100% of both the protection buyers and
sellers are institutional investors, with the public having no exposure, or
virtually none, to these contracts.” 54 Extending this line of reasoning,
Nirenberg and Hoffman point out that neither the SEC nor CFTC—
which have established exceptions for experienced buyers—apply the
workings of securities and commodities laws to CDS markets. 55
Beyond the sophistication of parties who trade CDS, fundamental
objectives of many CDS transactions set them apart from garden-variety
insurance contracts. The ability in CDS, to both separate actual loss
from amount recovered and dissociate reference entities from sources of
credit exposure, reveals a very different game from the insurance world,
where one is expected to receive compensation in direct proportion to
demonstrable loss that is tied to an “insurable interest.” 56 Concluding,
Nirenberg and Hoffman underscore that these added features, when
given prominent place in CDS agreements, allow hedging activities that
For example, New York insurance law provides that any violation of the insurance
code would be a misdemeanor and subject the violator to a fine of $1,000 for the first
violation and $2,500 for each subsequent violation. The state of Delaware could even
require a Delaware corporation to forfeit its charter if it is found to be conducting an
insurance business without a license. Thus, if credit default swaps are deemed
insurance by an insurance regulator, a protection seller could be subject to criminal
prosecution, substantial fines, and forfeiture of its corporate charter unless it
maintained the requisite licenses.

Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 8.
51.
Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 15.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at 16.
56.
Id. at 13-14.
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give flexibility beyond mere loss compensation and—hopefully—
forestall efforts to label CDS as a form of insurance. 57
In late 2004, an amendment to New York’s insurance laws
permanently quelled the worries of those who feared insurance treatment
for CDS. In an addition to Article 69 on financial guarantee insurance
corporations, the New York Senate and Assembly defined CDS as:
An agreement referencing the credit derivative definitions published
from time to time by the International Swap and Derivatives
Association, Inc. or otherwise acceptable to the superintendent,
pursuant to which a party agrees to compensate another party in the
event of a payment default by, insolvency of, or other adverse credit
event in respect of, an issuer of a specified security or other
obligation; provided that such agreement does not constitute an
insurance contract and the making of such credit default swap does
58
not constitute the doing of an insurance business.

Sidestepping the issue of how or why CDS differ from insurance
contracts, the statute simply makes clear that the two are not
synonymous; indeed, to be classified as insurance contracts is to lose
status as CDS. And so one is left to ask whether CDS and insurance are
independent merely as a per se rule under New York law or whether
there exists a fundamental difference between the two instruments.
B. Introduction to the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners’ Draft White Paper and Its Relation to Credit Default
Swaps
Although New York has distinguished CDS from insurance, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) issued a
Draft White Paper in 2003 that—despite being aimed at weather
derivatives—has important consequences for the question of whether
state regulators might be willing to view CDS as insurance. 59 The
NAIC’s approach merits attention because, as a body composed of all of
the state’s insurance commissioners that has met regularly for over 130
57.
58.

Id. at 16.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901(j-1) (2005) (italics added); 2004 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch.
605 (S. 6679-A) (approved and effective Oct. 19, 2004).
59.
Prop. and Cas. Ins. Comm., Weather Financial Instruments (Temperature):
Insurance or Capital Markets Products? (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs Draft White
Paper, Sept. 2, 2003), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_
papers_weather_insurance.pdf (hereinafter Draft White Paper).
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years, its suggestions often find its way into state law. 60
The Draft White Paper addresses the nascent weather derivatives
market, which the NAIC concludes should be regulated as insurance. 61
In support of this conclusion the NAIC forwards two main rationales.
Its first rationale focuses on the fact that the purpose of weather
derivatives, like weather insurance contracts, is risk transfer from one
entity to another for a fee. It all started innocently enough, energy
providers trying to hedge the risk of low demand for natural gas and
heating oil in mild weather and the high cost of buying such products in
the open market when demand outstripped supply in extremely cold
weather. 62 But according to the NAIC, energy providers quickly began
entering into weather-related energy “trades” on products unrelated to
their core interests. 63 Insurance and reinsurance companies then entered
the fray, participating in trades with the energy providers who became
“professional acceptors of risk transfers from other entities.” 64 NAIC
explains that “[g]enerally, businesses that are involved in accepting risk
transfers for a fee are known as insurers and the fee paid by the entity
seeking to transfer its risk is known as premium.” 65
Placing this formulation of the NAIC’s chief rationale in a meansversus-ends context, the NAIC is essentially saying that the means
utilized for obtaining risk transfer do not matter. If your end-goal is to
transfer and distribute risk for a fee, you are trading insurance products.
A salient comparison in this regard might be to sham transactions in the
tax context—a sham being any transaction that has no legitimate
business purpose other than to avoid taxation. 66 In like manner, the
60.
See, e.g., Eric C. Nordman, The Early History of the NAIC, 19 J. INS. REG.
164 (2000) (discussing the origins of the NAIC in May 1871); A Special Issue at the
Dawn of the New Millennium of Insurance Regulation, Editor’s Perspective, 19 J. INS.
REG. 159, 161 (2000) (stating that, “[t]he NAIC has become a de facto central
authority”).
61.
See supra note 59, at 2, 8. Weather derivatives, like CDS, emerged as major
capital markets products in the mid-1990s. Although the Draft White Paper does not
draw such a distinction it is clear that the NAIC is addressing OTC weather and energy
derivatives and not exchange-traded derivatives.
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Gregory v. Helvering is
a classic “sham” case in which taxpayer intended to effect a distribution of shares and
simultaneously avoid double taxation of the distribution. To accomplish this end, the
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NAIC seems to argue that the transaction documents involved in
weather derivatives are merely a charade aimed at escaping regulation
under state insurance regimes. Driving its point home, the NAIC gives
the following table comparing weather insurance and weather
derivatives.
NAIC COMPARISON OF WEATHER INSURANCE AND WEATHER
DERIVATIVES
SUBJECT
Who is covered?
When does coverage
apply?
What is the maximum
amount that will be paid?
What is the event that
causes a loss?
How much does it cost?
What is the neutral
source of trigger of
coverage?
What is the threshold for
determining that a loss
has occurred?
What document is
provided to the
purchaser?
Settlement Provisions

WEATHER INSURANCE
PRODUCTS
Named Insured
Policy Period
Coverage Limits

WEATHER DERIVATIVES
Transaction Purchaser
Protection Period (also
called an Effective Date
and Termination Date)
Limit of Payout

Weather Peril Insured
Against (Temperature,
Rain or Snow)
Premium
Agreed upon U.S.
Weather Reporting
Station
Trigger of Coverage or
Claim

Weather Peril of Rain,
Snow or Temperature

Insurance Policy

Transaction

Valued at

Value at Risk

Premium or fees
Agreed upon U.S.
Weather Reporting
Station
Strike Amount or
Attachment

In establishing its second rationale, the NAIC reports that “these
energy traders might have artificially inflated the indexes used to
establish the price of natural gas.” 67 Offering no explanation of how the
profit motive of energy traders is linked to high natural gas prices or
theory of how traders could use weather derivatives to fix such prices,

taxpayer structured her deal as a corporate reorganization. Commenting on taxpayer’s
strategy, the Supreme Court said: “No doubt, a new and valid corporation was created.
But that corporation was nothing more than a contrivance to the end [of tax avoidance].
It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed, as it was intended from
the beginning it should perform, no other function.” Helvering, 293 U.S. at 469.
67.
Id. at 8.
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the NAIC quickly concludes that if weather and energy derivatives were
“monitored as insurance products, it is likely that the regulatory scrutiny
involved would help minimize the likelihood that the price manipulation
would occur.” 68 The NAIC stresses that not only would manipulation be
reduced, but state regulators could then review such contracts for “fair
treatment,” lack of “excessive” or “unfairly discriminatory” rates, and
solvency of the counterparties. Even if one conceded that weather
derivatives bore some relation to price manipulation and that state
insurance regulators could combat price fixing, the NAIC’s ad hoc
reasoning does not explain why energy traders—and, a fortiori,
insurance or reinsurance companies—lack powers of bargaining,
analysis, and negotiation to such an extent that state regulators would
have to ensure fair treatment.
Six months after the NAIC released its Draft White Paper, ISDA
and The Bond Market Association issued separate responses, both of
which discredited the NAIC’s approach in the Draft White Paper and
urged its rejection. 69 Fundamentally, ISDA argues that weather
derivatives are not insurance because they do not comport with the
“insurable interest” and “loss indemnification” elements inherent in all
insurance contracts. Moreover, instead of simply spreading risk among
a population of insurance policy holders, weather derivatives “reduce
risk through trading—matching counterparties with complementary and
offsetting risk profiles.” 70
Last, ISDA argues that the weather
derivatives market has been tinged by no scandal worthy of regulation
(despite the vague NAIC argument to the contrary). The Bond Market
Association echoed ISDA’s sentiments, 71 and both organizations
echoed, to some extent, the approach advocated by the Office of General
Counsel of the New York Insurance department:

68.
69.

Id.
Letter from Robert G. Pickel, Executive Director and CEO, ISDA, to Ernst N.
Csiszar, President, NAIC and Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Insurance
Markets, NAIC (Feb. 23, 2004), available at http://www.isda.org [hereinafter ISDA
Letter to NAIC]; Letter from Michele C. David, Vice President and Asst. General
Counsel, The Bond Market Ass’n, to Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Insurance
Markets, NAIC, and Ernst N. Csiszar, President, NAIC (Mar. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.bondmarkets.com/regulatory/comment_letter_to_naic_on_risked-linked.pdf
(hereinafter Bond Market Ass’n Letter to NAIC).
70.
ISDA Letter to NAIC, supra note 69, at 7.
71.
Bond Market Ass’n Letter to NAIC, supra note 69, at 1-2.

2007]

RISK DISTRIBUTION IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS

187

Weather derivatives do not constitute insurance contracts under
Section 1101(a) of the New York Insurance Law because the terms
of the instrument do not provide that, in addition to or as part of the
triggering event, payment to the purchaser is dependent upon that
party suffering a loss. Under such instruments, the issuer is
obligated to pay the purchaser whether or not that purchaser suffers a
loss. Neither the amount of the payment nor the trigger itself in the
weather derivative bears a relationship to the purchaser’s loss.
Absent such obligations, the instrument is not an insurance
72
contract.

As noted, the debate surrounding the NAIC Draft White Paper is
limited explicitly to weather and energy derivatives. How do CDS fit
into this debate? In its response to the Draft White Paper, ISDA
additionally cautions that the NAIC, in demolishing customary notions
of insurance, gives “no replacement criteria to distinguish insurance
from the many other varieties of risk management contracts. The Draft
White Paper’s logic could extend to a broad array of derivatives and
would create substantial and disruptive regulatory uncertainty.” 73
ISDA’s concern applies more urgently in CDS than most derivative
contexts.
Both of the NAIC’s arguments in favor of making insurance
regulation apply to weather derivatives pertain to CDS with equal force.
Looking at the first NAIC rationale, credit protection sellers are
“involved in accepting risk transfers for a fee,” 74 which makes them
insurers. The spread paid by protection buyers is nothing more than an
insurance premium. Abstracting away from the second NAIC rationale,
the mere “likelihood” of some catastrophe caused by derivatives posing
as insurance is reason enough to step in and regulate so that the
“insuring public [will not miss out] on many . . . market regulatory
benefits that state insurance regulation provides.” 75 The doomsayers
among CDS market observers predicted that “derivatives tsunamis” and
credit-market “blowups” could give NAIC-minded regulators ample
reasons to step in and govern. 76
72.
2000 Inf. OGC Op. N.Y. Dept. Ins. 26, available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us
/rg000205.htm.
73.
Letter from Robert G. Pickel, Executive Director and CEO, to Ernst N.
Csiszar, President of NAIC, and Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Insurance
Markets, NAIC, supra note 69, at 2.
74.
Draft White Paper, supra note 59, at 6.
75.
Id. at 8.
76.
See, e.g., Der Hovanesian et al., supra note 6.
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Thus, NAIC reasoning leads to the conclusion that CDS must be
regulated as insurance. By contrast, opponents of such reasoning, which
includes ISDA and NY, insist that CDS and other derivatives possess
both formal and substantive characteristics that should prevent them
from being regulated as insurance. Is the dispute simply a spitting
match, or does one side have the better argument?
C. Robust Theory of Credit Default Swaps as Capital Markets Products
Despite the similarities between CDS and insurance contracts, it
is clear that there are significant differences between the two. NAICminded regulators argue that the differences are merely cosmetic and
that the ISDA system of documentation merely embellishes classic feebased risk distribution, which is the foundation of every insurance
contract. The following analysis will address such arguments on two
levels. First, the argument that CDS are essentially the same as
insurance contracts will be assessed at the contract level, and the
divergences between the two will be noted, catalogued, and integrated to
illustrate how CDS differ from insurance contracts. Second, the notion
that CDS should be subject to insurance regulation will be evaluated at a
market level. Although CDS work to spread risks among participants,
the mechanism and the purpose of its risk distribution are different from
their counterparts in insurance markets. These differences will be taken
and combined to state how CDS markets differ from insurance markets.
1. Credit Default Swaps as Capital Market Products: Contract Analysis
In order to identify some bright-line rules that separate insurance
and CDS, commentators quickly point to the insurance law principles of
indemnity and insurable interest. 77 Although these two concepts
substantially explain how CDS differ from insurance instruments, they
do not fully account for all of the differences that set the two regimes
apart. To apply these principles and put them in their proper setting, it
will help to start with a fundamental observation and then to allow
questions that guide analysis. At bottom, both insurance products and
CDS are arrangements based on contracts. Working from this kernel of
similarity, six questions will develop the present analysis into an
77.
See, e.g., Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 13-15; Letter from Robert
G. Pickel, Executive Director and CEO, to Ernst N. Csiszar, President of NAIC, and
Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Insurance Markets, NAIC, supra note 69, at 2-6.
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explanatory theory: (a) Who can enter into the contract? (b) To what
property can the contract extend coverage? (c) To what extent can the
purchaser transfer the contract? (d) What events and subsequent action
warrant a claim under the contract? (e) How does the contract measure
recovery? (f) How do the parties settle a contract?
The evaluation that follows will treat each of these questions in
turn, comparing and contrasting the results that each yields when applied
to insurance and CDS regimes.
a. Who Can Enter Into the Contract?
Any person who has a legitimate economic interest in preserving
property from loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage can enter into an
insurance contract. 78 To have such an interest is, in fact, to have an
“insurable interest.” 79 Failure of this interest will almost certainly mean
either that an insurance contract never existed in the first place or that
recovery will be denied. 80
By contrast, the only prerequisite to entering into CDS is that the
participants be “eligible” parties under the appropriate federal acts (a
hurdle aimed at keeping inexperienced and undercapitalized parties
away from trading). 81 Assuming that CDS participants are major
financial institutions, which is persistently the case, they do not need to
hold any interest in preserving property from loss. 82 A protection buyer
might have an interest in protecting a loan portfolio from loss; it could,
however, simply feel exposed to a given market due to various factors
and wish to buy protection despite not owning any insurable asset.
Either way, CDS can be used to hedge risk.

78.
See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law: A Guide to
Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines and Commercial Practices § 3.4(a)(1)-(5), at
164-72 (practitioner’s ed. 1988); id. § 3.3(b)(2), at 153. The use of “legitimate” in this
context means “legal” or “lawful.” The authors comment that a lawful interest “is not,
for example, an interest that exists only because of an expectation of profit from illegal
activity (such as an interest in contraband liquor).” Id. § 3.4(a)(5), at 169.
79.
Id. § 3.4(a)(1), at 164-65.
80.
See id.; Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and
Public Policy 35 (Yale University Press 1986).
81.
See, e.g., Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1(a)(12), 2(d).
82.
See, e.g., Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 13-14.
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b. To What Property Can The Contract Extend?
Insurance contracts cover only risk of loss arising out of property
in which the insured has an insurable interest. 83 In other words, insurers
cover property that the insured has incentive to protect from loss and
damage. Insurance authorities Robert Keeton and Kenneth Abraham
both explain that this requirement works at the contract level to mitigate
moral hazard, which accompanies insurance contracts because “insureds
sometimes have more information about their expected loss than
insurers. Certainly because insureds can control their own behavior,
they have it within their power to act inconsistently with insurer’s
interests by taking less care that they would were they not insured.” 84
By requiring the insured’s vested economic interest in covered property,
insurers can be more certain that loss will be caused by statistically
predictable exogenous events rather than events within the insured’s
control.
Since they do not have an “insurable interest” aspect, CDS allow
protection buyers to hedge exposure to credit risk regardless of its
source, even permitting speculative use unrelated to any actual risk.85
The 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions and Confirmation do not
require contracting parties to designate property in which protection
buyers have an insurable interest; instead, the confirmation directs
parties to designate a “reference entity.”86 The reference entity can be
any corporation, index, fund or other benchmark that the parties
designate. This allows the parties to dissociate the reference entity from
the protection buyer’s source of actual credit exposure (an ability that
would vitiate an insurance contract).
Information asymmetries occur in both insurance contracts and
CDS, albeit causing a different effect. Just as the insurer knows that its
83.
84.

See, e.g., Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78, § 3.4(a)(1)-(5), at 164-72.
Abraham, supra note 80, at 35; see Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78,
§ 6.6(e)(3), at 700-01; see also id. § 3.1(c), at 136-39.
85.
In its 2005 CDS report, FitchRatings reveals that “[r]espondents identified the
following three factors as the principal driving forces for using CDS: trading, credit risk
portfolio management, and alternative investment class.” FitchRatings Report 2005,
supra note 3, at 7. In contrast, the authors note that speculation and wagering were
absolutely inimical to the historical purposes of insurance law. See Keeton & Widiss,
supra note 78, § 3.1(c), at 136-39. This sets insurance contracts even further apart from
CDS as instruments for distributing risk.
86.
ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, § 2.1, § 2.3, at 6, 9, Exhibit A, at 6162.
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insured has superior knowledge as to potential loss, protection sellers
likewise worry about the possibility that the protection buyer has better
information on the credit risk involved in the trade. But insurers and
protection sellers worry about these asymmetries for different reasons.
The insurer’s information asymmetry is problematic because of its
relation to moral hazard (to the likelihood that the insured will fail to
exercise due care), thus causing a higher chance that the insurer will be
required to make payment. A credit protection seller is not worried
about moral hazard. It is worried that that potential information
asymmetry will result in an inaccurate spread, which could spoil either
the risk neutrality of the hedge that has been put in place or the expected
return from CDS used as investments.
c. To What Extent Can the Purchaser Transfer the Contract?
In addition to the “insurable interest doctrine,” another key
insurance law axiom dictates that “insurance is a personal contract.” 87
Explaining this doctrine, one state supreme court explained that “the
identity of the insured is a matter of importance to the insurance
company.” 88 Insurance companies use information on the identities of
those whom they insure to effectively assess and distribute risk. If the
identity of the insured changes, the risk profile of the insurance contract
also changes. As a result, the doctrine of “insurance as personal
contract” and its effects generally work to restrict the ability of insureds
to transfer their interest in an insurance contract. 89 Although the
insured’s interests under a contract can be transferred, this typically
requires securing the approval of the insurer and, depending on the type
of insurance transaction, occurs rarely. 90
To illustrate this point, one can imagine two neighbors, each of
whom drives a BMW 525 sedan made in 2006 with standard
specifications. Neighbor A is twenty-one years old. He received the
BMW from his father as a birthday present and has received two
speeding tickets in the last six months. He attends a local community
college and receives barely adequate grades. Neighbor B is fifty years
old. He has worked at the same accounting firm for the last twenty-five
87.
88.

Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78, § 3.1(d)(2), at 140.
Id. at 140 n.5 (citing McHugh v. Manhattan Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 109
N.W.2d 842, 844 (1961)).
89.
Id. § 4.2(e), at 316.
90.
Id.
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years and has never received a speeding ticket. If B decided that he was
done driving and wanted to transfer his insurance policy to A, one
imagines that the insurer would not allow the transfer (and if it did, A
would certainly not pay the same premium that B paid).
In CDS, the protection seller is less concerned with the identity of
the protection buyer than it is with the spread that the protection buyer
pays. This is not to say that the protection seller is completely
indifferent to its counterparty risk; it is instead to underscore the fact that
the accuracy of the CDS spread, as opposed to the counterparty’s
identity, will be the metric that determines how well the CDS works to
diffuse credit risk. Moreover, since information on the top reference
entities is so plentiful, accurate CDS spreads give great liquidity to the
CDS market and facilitate easy trading. 91 To transfer interests under a
CDS agreement or portfolio to another party, the parties enter into a
novation transaction, which is documented in its own confirmation. 92
The difference between CDS contract transferability and insurance
policy transferability underscores another vital difference between the
two systems: the relative bargaining power of the parties. Insurers, to a
large extent, are able to dictate the terms of insurance policies to their
purchasing counterparties. 93 The bargaining relationship between
insurer and insured is asymmetrically skewed toward the insurer. In
CDS, the protection buyer and protection seller co-negotiate the
agreement that eventually gets memorialized in a Confirmation. Unlike
an insurance contract, the buyer is just as likely and able to transfer its
interest in a CDS contract as a seller—bilateral novation is the only
hurdle. In CDS trades, the relationship between protection buyer and
protection seller is symmetrical.
d. What Events and Subsequent Action Warrant a Claim Under the
Contract?
Once a purchaser has entered into either an insurance contract or a
91.
See, e.g., Hull, supra note 5, at 510 (commenting that “[i]n addition to
monitoring credit spreads, indices provide a way market participants can easily buy or
sell a portfolio of credit default swaps”).
92.
ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, Exhibit F, at 77. In general, transfer
of interests in an OTC derivatives transaction is governed by Section 7 of the ISDA
Master Agreement, which can be instantiated by the CDS Novation Confirmation. See
ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 35, § 7, at 15.
93.
See Abraham, supra note 80, at 32-34.
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CDS, it performs under the contract by paying periodic premiums until
events occur that trigger obligations on the part of the insurer or
protection seller. In an insurance contract, a loss- or damage-causing
insured event will trigger the insured’s duty to inform insurer of the loss
or damage. 94 Analogously, in the Confirmation filled out pursuant to a
CDS trade, the buyer and seller designate which “credit events” will
apply to their trade. 95 A credit event can be the reference entity’s
bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation default, obligation acceleration,
restructuring, or other event. 96 Unlike the loss required in the insurance
context, a credit event does not have to affect the protection buyer
directly or cause damage (although it could).
When an insured suffers a loss, the loss triggers a number of
documents that flow between the insured and the insurer. The insured
must promptly submit both a “notice of loss,” and “proof of loss.” 97
Failure to submit either document can result in denial of coverage. 98 In
response to the insured’s filings, the insurer gives the insured “all
documents which the insured receives in the event a suit is filed against
the insured.” 99
In CDS transactions, where the provable loss requirement does not
exist, a successful claim on occurrence of a credit event requires only
one document: a Credit Event Notice. 100 The Credit Event Notice,
making reference to publicly available information that is laid out in a
prior confirmation, simply states that “a Credit Event occurred with
respect to the Reference Entity” and gives a brief description of the
event. 101 In response to the Credit Event Notice, the protection buyer
and seller perform under the terms of the CDS confirmation.
e. How Does the Contract Measure Recovery?
When an insured suffers a protected loss under an insurance policy,
her recovery can be measured in one of three ways. Typically, insurers
cover property to the extent of its “actual cash value,” which is usually
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78, § 7.2(a), (c), at 749, 58-59.
ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, Exhibit A, at 64.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 749, 58-59.
Id. § 7.2(c), at 759.
Id. § 7.2(a), at 749.
See ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, Exhibit B, at 71.
Id.
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measured against its fair market value. 102 Where objects do not have a
fair market value that can be readily ascertained, insurance policies
measure recovery either by its replacement value or by the original price
paid for it by the insured. 103 Regardless of whether recovery is
measured in terms of actual cash value, replacement value, or original
price paid, the principle of indemnity caps recovery in order to prevent
net gain to the insured. 104 Indeed, the entire insurance system is based
on the notion that “the amount of insurance benefits paid when a loss is
sustained by an insured is not to exceed the economic measure of the
loss.” 105 In other words, without demonstrable loss there can be no
recovery under a contract by any measure and the amount recovered can
never exceed the loss.
The framework for CDS transactions and the ISDA documentation
that accompanies it does not measure recovery against actual loss.
Instead, ISDA and CDS documents define recovery in terms of a
reference entity, settlement terms, settlement method, valuation metrics,
and deliverable obligations negotiated by the protection buyer and seller
as expressed in a confirmation. 106 Under this mechanism, the amount
that a protection seller pays out upon a credit event may bear little or no
relation to the protection buyer’s loss (assuming that the buyer even
sustained a loss). 107 Thus, the measure of recovery under CDS does not
preserve the principle of indemnity.
f. How Do the Parties Settle a Contract?
Although the tort litigation process in some insurance cases can
adjust the exact route of payment from an insurer to its insured, the
general rule is that insurer pays the insured a cash sum for its loss
according the measure of loss prescribed in the insurance policy. In
CDS, the parties can designate either cash settlement or physical
settlement. Explaining the cheapest-to-deliver bond rule in the context
of CDS physical settlement, David Nirenberg comments:

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78, § 3.9(a), at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id. § 3.6(a), at 191-92.
Id. § 3.1(a), at 135.
See ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, Exhibit A, at 62-69.
See Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 14.
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In some credit default swaps, the protection buyer can deliver any
obligation of a reference entity rather than the reference obligation.
This would be like insuring a late-model luxury vehicle and, on an
insurable event in which the vehicle is significantly damaged, the
insured gets to keep the damaged luxury vehicle and delivers an old
rusted-out, high-mileage, low-end model of the same manufacturer
to the insurer while the company delivers the luxury vehicle’s
replacement value. This does not comport with traditional concepts
108
of insurance.

Thus, the process of physical settlement—especially where a
cheapest-to-deliver rule applies—radically differentiates CDS settlement
from insurance settlement. But what about cash settlement under CDS?
When CDS counterparties opt for cash settlement, they designate a
“calculation agent” in their confirmation. 109 As the amount due under a
cash-settled arrangement comes due, the calculation agent’s task is to
“poll market participants to determine the value of the defaulted assets,
and the protection seller is liable for the difference between face and
recovery values.” 110 Whereas the claims assessor under an insurance
contract is an agent of the insurer, the calculation agent is a designee of
both parties, which underscores the symmetrical relationship between
the protection buyer and the protection seller.
While the possibility of physical settlement and a dual-appointed
calculation agent distinguish the CDS settlement process, the starkest
differences between insurance and CDS settlement processes arise in
consideration of the ISDA Master Agreement’s “one agreement,”
“cross-payment netting,” and “close-out netting” provisions. 111 Since
insurance is inherently a “personal contract,” it is often overlooked but
nonetheless vital that each contract is separate and requires separate
settlement. Not so for CDS. Where two parties execute a string of
separate CDS under an ISDA Master Agreement, each with its own
confirmation, then all of the trades “form a single agreement between
the parties . . . and the parties would not otherwise enter into any
[t]ransactions.” 112 As a result of this contractual device, the parties can
elect to apply cross-payment netting to their CDS. To illustrate this, one
can imagine two banks that have entered into dozens of CDS with one
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
ISDA Credit Definitions, supra note 37, Exhibit A, at 62.
See Bomfin, supra note 25, at 69.
ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 35, §§ 1(c), 2(c), 6, at 1, 2, 11-12.
Id. § 1(c), at 1.
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another, each bank holding both long and short positions. One bank
wishes to transfer all of its trades to another counterparty and the other
bank agrees to the novation transaction. Instead of individually
reckoning the balance on each trade, paying piecemeal, the banks can
calculate the net amount owing under all trades and settle the accounts in
one net payment.
The one-agreement, cross-payment mechanism—perhaps more than
any other aspect indigenous to CDS—represents how far the derivatives
regime is from an insurance model. Everything about insurance—
insurable interest, indemnification, personal contract—militates against
the notion of a net amount that could be paid out on multiple contracts in
absence of any demonstrable loss.
2. Credit Default Swaps as Capital Markets Products: Market Analysis
The foregoing analysis demonstrates elemental differences between
CDS and insurance at the contract level. As patterns emerge from the
interplay between these contract-level distinctions, a broader perspective
on the market differences between CDS and insurance emerges. Two
main differences come to the fore: (1) risk classes versus credit spread as
the means of neutralizing risk and (2) (cross-buyer) liquidity.
Hundreds of millions of “personal contracts” constitute the
insurance world—contracts in which “the identity of the insured is a
matter of importance to the insurance company.” 113 The insured’s
identity—and more specifically the property in which the insured has an
interest subject to the insurer’s indemnity—matters so much because it
is the best single indicator of the probability that the insurer will have to
make payment under the insurance contract. Responding to this reality,
insurers specialize in categorizing and quantifying identity-related risks
to maintain a profit-preserving ratio of policies to claims. Commenting
on insurers’ efforts to categorize, Kenneth Abraham explains that the
most effective tool for minimizing the effects of moral hazard,
preserving a steady return, and distributing risk:
[I]s to create risk classes and to vary the prices charged for coverage,
depending on the expected loss of each class of insureds. The more
accurate and detailed this risk classification, the greater its influence

113.
Keeton & Widiss, supra note 78, § 3.1(d)(2), at 140 n.5 (citing McHugh v.
Manhattan Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 363 Mich. 324, 328, 109 N.W.2d 842, 844
(1961)).
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on the allocation between loss prevention and insurance . . . . In
constructing risk classes, the insurer’s goal is to determine the
expected loss of each insured and to place insureds with expected
similar losses into the same class, so that each may be charged the
114
same rate.

By creating classes of insureds that correspond to individual risk
profiles, the insurance market is able to efficiently spread catastrophic
risk across the full spectrum of policyholders. In contrast, derivatives
“reduce risk through trading—matching counterparties with
complementary and offsetting risk profiles.” 115 In the world of CDS, the
one element that allows parties to trade and match offsetting risk profiles
is the credit spread. Whereas insurance companies group policyholders
based on real-world, historical data, CDS credit spreads are calculated
based on a risk-neutral model of evaluating the default probabilities of
individual reference entities. 116 This risk-neutral valuation model places
CDS in the same company as options, forwards, and other derivatives
that are clearly recognized as capital market products despite their added
ability to spread and hedge risk.
The other feature that strongly differentiates the CDS market from
the market for insurance policies is the existence of credit indices. In
insurance markets, insurers have the ability to trade, transfer and
securitize policies amongst themselves; policyholders, however (as their
name would suggest), simply hold policies. Policyholders generally
cannot transfer their interests; to the extent that they can, they cannot do
it in a way nor on a scale that would give rise to a market. As a result,
insurance markets (at least on the policyholder side) possess no
instrument allowing for price discovery, which would increase liquidity.
In CDS markets, the rise of Dow Jones CDX and iTraxx has created
an enormous amount of liquidity. As noted, market makers are able to
quote long and short spreads for CDS at practically all times, allowing
both protection buyers and protection sellers to constantly evaluate the
value of their trades and transfer if desired. This development, more
than perhaps any other that has been mentioned, firmly marks CDS as
capital markets products.

114.
115.

Abraham, supra note 80, at 15, 68.
Letter from Robert G. Pickel, Executive Director and CEO, to Ernst N.
Csiszar, President of NAIC, and Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Insurance
Markets, NAIC, supra note 69, at 7.
116.
See Hull, supra note 5, at 244-47, 468-89, 510-13.
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One last brief observation on how CDS markets differ from
insurance markets merits recognition. In assessing CDS, state insurance
regulators must keep in mind that CDS are not products which can be
purchased by the general populace. As already noted multiple times, the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 amended the
Commodities Exchange Act to limit the field of prospective CDS
buyers—only “eligible contract participants” need apply. As long as
CDS trades take place between eligible contract participants, Congress
has generally prohibited the SEC and CFTC from regulating CDS.
David Nirenberg and Richard Hoffman rightly conclude: “If Congress
has determined that no regulation of these products is appropriate, it
would seem inappropriate for a state to determine that there is a
compelling state interest in regulating them to protect its citizens.” 117
3. Credit Default Swaps as Capital Markets Products: A Theory
And so it comes time to state a theory. The table below
summarizes and compares the contract and market differences between
insurance and CDS.
SUMMARY COMPARISON OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND INSURANCE
INQUIRY
WHO CAN ENTER INTO
THE CONTRACT?

CONTRACTING
PARTY MUST
POSSESS
INSURABLE
INTEREST?
ELIGIBILITY UNDER
FEDERAL LAW?

117.

INSURANCE
Any person possessing an
economic interest in
preserving property from
loss, destruction, or
pecuniary damage
Yes

CDS
Any bank, insurance
company, corporation
or other eligible party
under the
Commodities
Exchange Act
No

No

Yes

Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 16.
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TO WHAT PROPERTY CAN
THE CONTRACT EXTEND
COVERAGE?

PROPERTY SUBJECT
TO INSURABLE
INTEREST?
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN
THE PURCHASER
TRANSFER THE
CONTRACT?

PARTY SYMMETRY?
WHAT EVENT INITIATES
A CLAIM FOR RECOVERY
UNDER THE CONTRACT?

REQUIREMENT OF
ACTUAL LOSS?

199

INSURANCE
Property that someone
has incentive to protect
from risk of loss,
destruction, or pecuniary
damage
Yes

CDS
Reference entity

No

Limited ability to
transfer, subject to
insurer’s approval

Easily transferable
upon novation by the
parties

No, asymmetrical
relation between insured
and insurer, skewed
toward insurer
Event inflicting loss,
destruction, or pecuniary
damage on covered
property
Yes

Yes, symmetrical
relation between
protection buyer and
protection seller
Credit event as
specified in ISDA
confirmation
No

ASSUMING OCCURRENCE
OF A RECOVERY EVENT,

(1) Notice of loss
(2) Proof of loss

Credit Event Notice

WHAT DOCUMENTS MUST
BE PRESENTED TO
CLAIM?
HOW DOES THE
CONTRACT MEASURE
RECOVERY?

Actual cash value,
original price paid, or
replacement value

In relation to reference
entity, settlement
terms, settlement
method, valuation
metrics, and
deliverable obligations
No

RECOVERY CAPPED
AT ACTUAL LOSS
(PRINCIPLE OF
INDEMNITY
APPLIES)?

Yes
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HOW DO THE PARTIES
SETTLE A CONTRACT?
POSSIBILITY OF
PHYSICAL
SETTLEMENT?
CHEAPEST-TODELIVER OPTION?
MANY CONTRACTS,
ONE AGREEMENT?
CROSS-PAYMENT
AND CLOSE-OUT
NETTING?
WHAT MECHANISM IS
USED TO VALUE RISK AT
A MARKET LEVEL?

MARKET MAKERS AND

INSURANCE
Cash settlement

[Vol. XII

No

CDS
Cash settlement or
physical settlement
Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Creation of risk classes
and variation of the
prices charged for
coverage based on class
No

Risk-neutral
evaluation of
reference entity
default probabilities
Yes

INDICES THAT SERVE
BOTH BUYERS AND
SELLERS?

In considering the weight of these various differences, stating a
theory is straightforward. In stating the theory’s propositions, the jargon
of insurance law will be avoided to the extent possible. The
propositions below are disjunctive; failure under any of them means that
the contract involved is not insurance. Any CDS trade will fulfill at
least one of the following propositions.
Proposition 1: Where a party enters into a contract for contingent
recovery possessing no economic interest in protecting the covered
property from loss or damage, the contract is not insurance.
Proposition 2: When the contract for recovery fails to reference
property that the purchasing party has economic incentive to protect
from loss or damage, the contract is not insurance.
Proposition 3: When recovery under a contract can be had without
substantiating any actual loss or damage, the contract is not insurance.
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Proposition 4: Where a party can recover under a contract an
amount that exceeds expenses caused by loss or damage, the contract is
not insurance.
Proposition 5: Where a contract for recovery allows physical
settlement, the contract is not insurance.
Proposition 6: Where a contract for recovery provides for crosspayment netting under a master agreement, the contract is not insurance.
IV. CONCLUSION: FEE-BASED RISK DISTRIBUTION IN THE CAPITAL
MARKETS
The capital markets always have been and always will be a vehicle
for efficiently distributing risk. Many financial instruments regulated
under Federal securities and commodities laws allow their users to fulfill
functions that resemble the general mechanism of an insurance contract.
However, not every contract that allows for fee-based distribution of risk
should also be subject to regulation under state insurance laws. Weather
derivatives represent one such instrument; CDS represent another.
While insurance companies target individual consumers—meriting
efforts by the state ensure fair conditions for consumers—CDS
transactions take place exclusively between banks and other
sophisticated parties. In considering whether CDS should be regulated
as insurance contracts under state law, state insurance regulators must
recognize the insoluble differences between the two groups of
instruments. CDS are not insurance.

